The Division of the Sciences in Aristotle's 'Posterior Analytics'
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics is a difficult read. It is well known that the surviving corpus of his works comprises rough drafts or lecture notes. These are known as his esoteric works while the finished, polished, crafted and accessible exoteric works are lost. Yet there is a sense of clarity and purpose in the attempts made in this rough and disjointed prose to found, to ground and to establish. There is a determination to mark out clearly how a science or discipline is formed and can take on the world, can meet rigorously the manifoldness of its subject matter. It is a way of arming those working in a science, of marking out the ground where they will meet nature in its diversity and potential for flourishing thought and practice.
Aristotle
begins by establishing the principles upon which any science or disciplines
will be founded. We depend on what is
primitive or prior rather than what is derived and demonstrated from something else. For Aristotle the primitive is
identical with appropriate principles for the work we are doing. Why does Aristotle believe we must begin by
establishing what is primitive in each science?
Aristotle appeals here to the absurdity of an infinite regress as he
does when formulating his famous Four Causes.
We require a stopping point to avoid an absurd situation where the
principles on which our work depends themselves depend on even more primitive
or prior principles. This brings
us to the conclusion that principles are non-demonstrable. Aristotle considers the view that first
principles can be given a circular and reciprocal demonstration. Yet he finds
this unsatisfying. Primitive first
principles must firmly establish a science.
If they are demonstrated via a circularity this gives us only the claim
that ‘this is the case if this is the case’. Aristotle argues that we could easily prove everything
in this way. What we need is a firm
foundation in particular principles appropriate to a particular science. This reveals the role and nature of deduction
in Aristotle’s thought. It must have
substance. Circularity is judged empty
because it give us no confidence that we have a solid ground. For Aristotle it is the ‘immediate and
non-demonstrable’ that will provide a stopping point in any possible infinite
regress and avoid an empty logical formulation by giving us ‘non-demonstrable
immediates’.
What is most striking here is a conviction concerning the concrete force of logic and deductive
logic in particular. In contrast to
David Hume, for whom his famous ‘fork’ separated the substance of sensory
experience from the emptiness of deductive logic, we find the concrete
impregnated and structured by deductive logic.
Those working in a science must stand upon logical foundations whether
they are in the midst of the change that is the subject of physics or contemplating
the changeless substances that metaphysics. Yet these are not rigid conceptual schemes brought in to enclose the concrete. There
must be something concrete in the very notion of logic for Aristotle. The threat of regress and emptiness is very
concrete in his thought, rather than being a matter of empty speculation as a
Humean scepticism might claim. He was
a practicing scientist, in zoology and botany in particular, although his works
in the later field have been lost to us.
The solidity of logic mattered here not simply in its inductive side,
normally associated with empirical endeavour, but as deduction. There is a feel for the concrete in his most
abstract work and equally a feel for the abstract when he is at his most
concrete, literally immersed in the natural world. These two poles do not
maintain their artificial separation in his work, it is too sophisticated in
its architectonic scope and scale. It relates the most concrete studies to the
most abstract. The Posterior Analytics challenges us to consider the nature of deduction, to relate it to a wider architectonic in Aristotle's work where the abstract becomes inextricably involved in the concrete.
In : Architectonics
null