Philosophical Naiveté

Posted by Edward Willatt on Monday, January 11, 2010 Under: Deleuze

A recent post at object-oriented philosophy puts the case for naiveté.  It seems that naiveté forms part of the method of an ‘object-oriented philosophy’.  This makes a comparison with Deleuze’s methodological naiveté interesting.  Deleuze’s philosophy of difference called for naiveté because difference was considered to be real rather than a structural, textual or linguistic difference that defers or masks any direct grasp of the real.  Differential Ideas are realised in sensation, through its intensive aspects, and this demands that we are naïve when we encounter differences in experience.  Difference is to provide an account of experience, a transcendental empiricism, through its direct incarnation in sensation.  In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari write of a system of the interruptions and breaks in flows of desire.  The language of flows and breaks used here calls for naiveté because these are material flows.  We are caught up in flows of the most material things, we participate in flows that offer the chance of escape and flight.  

The post on object-oriented philosophy puts the case very well when it is suggested that we are grounded in naiveté, in our dependence upon sustenance and upon bodily functioning, in our moods and our concern with the weather.  This seems to echo the approach Deleuze took, one that seeks to work out how experience is marked out by singularities that account for it.  We look at the external world, in the depths of singular things, to account for experience rather than seeking to form sophisticated abstractions.  The conclusion drawn is that adults make false claims to have grown out of a childhood naiveté into what is really a cynicism and negativity about the real, one that disguises our grounding in the very singularities that naiveté is in touch with.  The conclusion is that becoming-naive is something to be pursued.  Adulthood is made to seem reactive.  For Deleuze it would be a molar form masking molecular processes which ground the transcendental illusion of adulthood.  How to realise this grounding in naiveté?  How to affirm new things and draw upon them without seeking to rise above the singular and concrete in the name of sophistication?  I think that Deleuze’s development of a notion of Ideas was an attempt to ground a methodological naiveté.  This would of course differ from the concern of ‘object-oriented philosophy’ to begin with objects and not cut across them by involving them in wider processes.

In : Deleuze 



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Philosophical Naiveté

Posted by Edward Willatt on Monday, January 11, 2010 Under: Deleuze

A recent post at object-oriented philosophy puts the case for naiveté.  It seems that naiveté forms part of the method of an ‘object-oriented philosophy’.  This makes a comparison with Deleuze’s methodological naiveté interesting.  Deleuze’s philosophy of difference called for naiveté because difference was considered to be real rather than a structural, textual or linguistic difference that defers or masks any direct grasp of the real.  Differential Ideas are realised in sensation, through its intensive aspects, and this demands that we are naïve when we encounter differences in experience.  Difference is to provide an account of experience, a transcendental empiricism, through its direct incarnation in sensation.  In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari write of a system of the interruptions and breaks in flows of desire.  The language of flows and breaks used here calls for naiveté because these are material flows.  We are caught up in flows of the most material things, we participate in flows that offer the chance of escape and flight.  

The post on object-oriented philosophy puts the case very well when it is suggested that we are grounded in naiveté, in our dependence upon sustenance and upon bodily functioning, in our moods and our concern with the weather.  This seems to echo the approach Deleuze took, one that seeks to work out how experience is marked out by singularities that account for it.  We look at the external world, in the depths of singular things, to account for experience rather than seeking to form sophisticated abstractions.  The conclusion drawn is that adults make false claims to have grown out of a childhood naiveté into what is really a cynicism and negativity about the real, one that disguises our grounding in the very singularities that naiveté is in touch with.  The conclusion is that becoming-naive is something to be pursued.  Adulthood is made to seem reactive.  For Deleuze it would be a molar form masking molecular processes which ground the transcendental illusion of adulthood.  How to realise this grounding in naiveté?  How to affirm new things and draw upon them without seeking to rise above the singular and concrete in the name of sophistication?  I think that Deleuze’s development of a notion of Ideas was an attempt to ground a methodological naiveté.  This would of course differ from the concern of ‘object-oriented philosophy’ to begin with objects and not cut across them by involving them in wider processes.

In : Deleuze 



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